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(c) We that patrols by His Majesty's ships for the purpose of intercepting pirates should continue so far as the strength of the squadron in the Far East allows.
(d) While recognizing that, for the present, the provision of regular naval and military guards on board ship must continue, we strongly recommend that the shipping companies should be informed that the provision of these guards will cease in one year's time, and that they will then have to assume full responsibility for the internal protection of their ships. (e) We suggest that the local authorities should be asked to consider how co-operation in intelligence between the various ports of call can be improved. (f) The root of piracy is firmly embedded in Chinese soil, and piracy can only We therefore be effectively suppressed by Chinese action on shore. suggest that strong representations should be made to the Nanking Government, if possible jointly with other foreign Powers, with a view to action being taken to this end. We suggest that the question of exacting reparation for injury to British lives or property should be considered. The above report was considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence at their 240th Meeting on the 8th March, 1929, and it was agreed-
4.
*(a) To recommend to the Cabinet that approval in principle should be given to the recommendations submitted by the Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 38 of their Report (C.I.D. Paper No. 330-C); and
(b) To recommend that the Admiralty should be authorised to instruct the Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, that the Anti-Piracy Committee at Hong Kong should proceed on the assumption that the policy recommended by the Chiefs of Staff will be adopted in principle, and should submit in due course detailed proposals for giving effect to this policy.
(c) To take note that the Foreign Office were prepared in principle to make representations to the Chinese Government at Nanking, either on the general question of piracy or in connection with each specific case, though they were not optimistic as to the result."
5. On Wednesday. the 13th March, 1929. the Cabinet approved the recom- mendations of the Committee of Imperial Defence as set forth above (Cabinet 11 (29), Conclusion 8), and the necessary instructions were communicated forthwith to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, the Anti-Piracy Committee. Hong Kong, and His Majesty's Minister at Peking.
As a result of these instructions, the Shipping Companies then enjoying the services of regular naval and military guards were informed that these guards would be definitely withdrawn on the 31st March, 1930, and that after that date complete responsibility for the internal protection of shipping against piratical attacks must be assumed by them.
6. Since the above decision was communicated to the Shipping Companies there have been many indications that the latter were extremely reluctant to dispense with the assistance of regular naval and military guards, and there is little doubt that they cherished the hope that inaction and delay in formulating a new scheme for the protection of shipping after the 31st March next might result in the provision of regular guards being continued. Frequent representations by the Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, that the Shipping Companies would be incurring grave responsibilities in not taking early steps to provide against the position which would arise on the withdrawal of the naval and military guards appear to have had little effect until last month.
7. As reported in the second paragraph of the attached telegram, representa- tions were made on the 13th February to the Officer Administering the Government of Hong Kong that he should receive a deputation for the purpose of considering a scheme for the formation of a special force to be created of good-class fighting men from India with an establishment of British or foreign N.C.O.'s, the whole to form a separate unit under its own Commanding Officer, and placed for training and discipline under the Naval Commander-in-Chief or the General Officer Commanding, It was suggested that the cost should be met in the first instance by the Government of Hong Kong and recovered by a surcharge on all shipping visiting the port, assisted by a grant in aid by the Imperial Government, and a contribution from the Singapore Government and other unspecified sources.
8.
The Officer Administering the Government of Hong Kong reports that, on receiving the deputation, he found that the scheme had only been considered in rest outline. No idea of the cost had been obtained, nor did the details involved seem to have been considered. The number of men required was tentatively stated to be 400, with 35 white N.C.O.'s and 4 white Headquarter Staff.
9. It was evident during the discussion that strong opposition would be offered to any general tax which would increase charges on shipping not interested in anti- piracy guards.
10.
The Officer Administering the Government of Hong Kong considered the scheme altogether too nebulous and too expensive to be undertaken at a moment's notice, and it was represented to the deputation that the only scheme admitting of prompt application was a development of the former system of Indian Guards, possibly supplemented by white N.C.O.'s. It was left to the deputation to confer with the Inspector-General of Police, Hong Kong, with a view to evolving a practical scheme at the earliest possible moment.
11. No further information is yet available as to the result of the conference with the Inspector-General, but the Oversea Defence Committee suggest that, unless very active steps are taken promote a scheme, and to induce the Companies cerned to accept it, a further delay of some mouths will occur. In any capameuld fit quits appear impossible to evolve and put into practice a satisfactory scheme by the 31st March, on which date, according to the present Cabinet decision, the regular naval and military guards are to be withdrawn.
12. The Committee are in full agreement with the views expressed by the Officer Administering the Government of Hong Kong on the vague proposals sub- mitted by the Shipping Companies.
They suggest that, since it has been accepted that the internal protection of ships against piracy is the responsibility of the Shipping Companies, any scheme which is evolved should be based on the following principles :-
(a) That the organization set up should be entirely independent of the British naval and military forces. Preferably, it should also be independent of British Colonial Police Forces, although, as suggested below, it is probably desirable that the initiation of the scheme should be undertaken by the Government of Hong Kong through the agency of the Inspector- General of Police.
(b) That the whole of the cost should be borne by the Shipping Companies making use of the organization, and by them alone, in proportion to their demands on it
13. With reference to (a), the Committee would invite particular attention to the serious disorganization of the British Naval and Military forces in the Far East which has been caused in recent years by the provision of anti-piracy guards. The Navy cannot provide detachments for this purpose without immobilising ships, whilst the training and efficiency for war of military units are seriously affected by the constant absence of large numbers of men and N.C.O.'s.
14. As regards (b), it is clearly inequitable that the cost of the scheme should be recovered by a surcharge on all shipping visiting Hong Kong (or Singapore), since many lines, such as the P. & O., who do not deal in coolie traffic or have a sufficient percentage of white personnel among their crews, never require the assistance of anti-piracy guards.
15. Although, as stated above, the inaction of the Shipping Companies during the last year has no doubt been largely due to a hope that, in the absence of measures for the protection of shipping after the 31st March, the regular guards might be continued, the Oversea Defence Committee recognize that it might be a matter of no little difficulty for a number of separate Shipping Companies to organize co-operatively what is in effect a small police force. The Companies have probably little of the organizing and administrative knowledge required, and undoubtedly have not the facilities for recruitment which are available to Government institu- tions, such as the Police.
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